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This special issue aims at offering an overview of the extremely rich 
discussion which Linda T. Zagzebski’s work on exemplarism (2006; 2010; 
2015)—and conclusively formulated in her 2017 volume ―Exemplarist Moral 
Theory‖—has generated within virtue ethics. Zagzebski’s theory is a neo-
Aristotelian and virtue-ethical approach which—unlike what is the case with all 
other foundational theories—finds its non-conceptual foundation in the direct 
reference to morally exemplary individuals identified through the emotion of 
admiration. It is such exemplary figures, Zagzebski claims, who fix the 
meaning of all fundamental moral terms, such as virtue, good life, good end, 
right action, duty, etc. Her theory explicitly harks back to Hilary Putnam’s and 
Saul Kripke’s theory of direct reference, according to which natural kind terms 
such as ―water‖ or ―gold‖ are identified indexically, without the need to know 
their deep features. Ordinary competent users of English language pick out 
instances of gold by referring to something like that, with such and such 
superficial features: according to Zagzebski, the same can be said of good 
persons, whom we can identify by referring to persons like that—that is, moral 
exemplars we recognize because they are supremely admirable—even without 
possessing moral concepts. 
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On the exemplarist view, identifying and revising the exemplars that 
provide the ground on which a community builds its moral concepts is not a 
business for single individuals; rather, it is the community itself, through its 
linguistic network, its inner division of moral linguistic labor, and its 
narratives, that determines and verifies the ordinary meaning of moral terms. 
Clearly, moral experts have some sort of a privileged function, in that they are 
in charge of monitoring the development of the meaning of moral exemplarity 
based on their knowledge of its deep features. 
Grounding the theory on the encounter with real, morally exemplary, 
human beings presents several advantages. One is that it allows to shed light 
on the priority of moral practices over moral theory as well as on an ordinary 
yet generally underestimated moral phenomenon such as the importance of 
following role-models that can shape one’s hierarchy of values and the 
structure of one’s moral character. Another is that, given the central role 
admiration plays within the theory, Zagzebski can provide an elegant account 
of moral motivation by situating the motivating element at the roots of the 
theory itself, as its own foundation. This feature constitutes the main ground 
of a renewed interest within the philosophy of education in the educational 
role of moral models, which was central in the ancient and medieval ages, yet 
the modernity set aside to avoid heteronomous and paternalistic drifts.1 
However, in addition to its evident merits, exemplarism raises several 
theoretical worries. One is that the central role of admiration commits the 
theory to account for the reliability of such an emotion, which does not seem 
immune from error. To justify admiration, the exemplarist needs to come up 
with a compelling theory of emotions and of their epistemic valence, which 
amounts to a hard task within a highly controversial domain. As an example, 
recall the ongoing dispute among perceptual theories (e.g. de Sousa 1987; 
Goldie 2000; Zagzebski 2003; Tappolet 2016), cognitivist theories (e.g. 
Nussbaum 2001; Roberts 2003), and attitudinal ones (Deonna -Teroni 2012; 
2015). 
Another worry concerns the ―agent-based‖ spirit of exemplarism as a virtue 
theory, as it opens the doors to the common objections faced by such 
theories—most of all, to the charge of circularity. As a matter of fact, if the 
theory lacks a conceptual foundation that precedes direct reference to moral 
exemplars, it is far from clear how one can reflect on the exemplars and their 
exceptionality without incurring the problems with admiration. Zagzebski 
addresses this issue by appealing to the notion of conscientious self-reflection 
 
1 Detailed considerations on exemplarist approaches in the philosophy of education are 
included in Kristjánsson 2006; Sanderse 2013; Sundari 2015; Croce - Vaccarezza 2017.  
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that she has originally proposed in her volume Epistemic Authority (2012). 
Now, she refers to this rational attitude as a theoretical tool to assess whether 
the admiration for an exemplar is consistent with other emotional and 
cognitive states an agent entertains. However, on closer inspection this move is 
highly problematic, in that it is not clear how one can evaluate the 
appropriateness of one’s own admiration based on its coherence with other 
emotions, when these emotions would need to undergo an analogous revision 
process to be considered reliable. The same worry arises if we need to evaluate 
admiration based on its coherence with moral beliefs, which should be 
grounded in the very same emotion. Finally, one might wonder how moral 
experts can know the deep features of exemplars so as to guide and revise the 
identification practices of a community or a linguistic network, if exemplars 
are both the only access key to moral concepts and the only way we have to fix 
the reference of such concepts. 
These considerations should suffice to show that the exemplarist theory has 
given rise to a lively discussion, as it is witnessed by the increasing number of 
conferences and events entirely devoted to this topic2. This special issue aims at 
offering an overview of this flourishing debate. The first four contributions of 
the issue introduce several historical views of exemplarity and its relevance for 
moral theory and practice, thereby exploring the deep roots of Zagzebski’s 
reasoning as well as potentially alternative, i.e. non-Aristotelian, models. In 
Virtù esemplari. L’etica tommasiana tra neoplatonismo e aristotelismo, Maria 
Silvia Vaccarezza adopts a Neoplatonic-Christian reading of Aquinas’ ethics to 
shed light on the common features as well as the differences between 
Aristotelian and Thomistic exemplarism3. Jeremy Hovda, in The Role of 
Exemplars in Kant’s Moral Philosophy, criticizes the standard reading of Kant 
as a fierce enemy of the use of exemplars in ethics by showing that moral 
exemplars are important to comply with imperfect duties. In his Nietzschean 
Exemplarism, Mark Alfano analyses Nietzsche’s work through digital 
humanities and highlights the most relevant traits of his peculiar, i.e. 
pluralistic, version of exemplarism. Finally, Bianca Bellini, in The Overarching 
Sway of Exemplars over Self-Knowledge and Self-Shaping. Their Nature, 
 
2 The first international conference entirely devoted to this topic, organized by Aretai – 
Center on Virtues—of which the two editors of this special issue are members—has been hosted 
at the University of Genoa on October 5-6, 2017, with the participation of Linda T. Zagzebski 
as keynote speaker. A full list of participants and the abstracts of their talks are available at: 
https://exemplarsgenoa.weebly.com/.   
3 When we discuss exemplarism in the classical tradition, we refer to a broad reading of this 
notion to indicate specific ways in which they consider the role of exemplary figures, without 
demanding that they provided a theory as fine-grained as Zagzebski’s. 
12  MARIA SILVIA VACCAREZZA – MICHEL CROCE 
 
  
Reach, Impact and Inherent Link with Phantasy, explores the role of 
exemplarity in self-knowledge and its destabilising impact according to Max 
Scheler’s perspective. 
The following three articles tackle Zagzebski’s view and challenge its key 
features. In the first essay, Following the Wrong Example: The Exclusiveness 
of Heroism and Sanctity, Simone Grigoletto individuates three problems 
inherent to Zagzebski’s account of emulation and puts forth an alternative 
formulation of exemplarism which makes no use of emulation, as well as a 
notion of supererogatory that is compatible with exemplarism and gives saints 
and heroes an authentic role of moral guides. Sarin Marchetti, in Two 
Varieties of Exemplarism, inquires into whether we could replace the classical 
reading of exemplarism as the thesis that the moral exemplars fix the 
reference of what is a virtue with a broad, i.e. anti-theoretical, thesis that an 
individual can radically change their lives insofar as they are personally 
involved with the exemplar’s life. Finally, Ariele Niccoli, in Un riesame della 
teoria esemplarista delle emozioni, takes into consideration one of the most 
problematic aspects of exemplarism, namely the theory of emotion on which it 
is based, to evaluate whether such cornerstone can adequately sustain the 
whole exemplarist structure.  
The three final contributions of the issue develop several exemplar-based 
paths in the philosophy of education, which certainly amounts to one of the 
most fruitful outputs of the exemplarist theory, as anticipated above. Michel 
Croce, in Il potenziale educativo degli esemplari intellettuali, analyses the 
educational implications of exemplarism to show that the theory can be used 
to educate the young to intellectual virtues, thereby calling attention to an 
underdeveloped topic arising out of Zagzebski’s work. Stephen Ellenwood, in 
Helping Students to Find and Frisk Good Exemplars, individuates several 
concrete ways to implement an exemplar-based educational programme and 
sheds light on several risks and precautions which educators should be made 
aware of while building such an educational curriculum. Finally, in Teaching 
as Invitation to Reasoning, Luca Tuninetti argues for the crucial role a 
teacher’s moral exemplarity plays in the transmission of knowledge via 
testimony, by distinguishing between mere transmission of testimonial 
knowledge and argumentation. 
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